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TEE'D OFF - GOLF COURSE DESIGNERS
SCORE DOUBLE BOGEY IN SEARCH FOR
PROTECTION OF THEIR HOLE DESIGNS
I. INTRODUCTION
Golf course designers and architects create some of the most
original and aesthetically pleasing landscape designs in the world.
Each hole design is a masterful combination of topography,
vegetation, and imagination. Few people possess the necessary
artistic ability to create and design such works of art. Jack
Nicklaus, Robert Trent Jones, Alister Mackenzie, and Bobby Jones,
just to name a few, are truly "masters" of the golf course architec-
ture industry. Since so many hours of designing and planning go
into each meticulous hole design, it is only natural that architects
want to protect their masterpieces from being copied. The question
is, how can they do so?
Golfs popularity has grown rapidly within the last several
years.1 Golf is now one of the most popular pastimes in this
country.2 Latest counts reveal that there are currently more than
14,000 golf courses and 24.5 million golfers in the United States.3
With this tremendous increase in the number of courses being
built, golf course architects need a way to protect their hole designs
from being copied. This Note reveals the shortage of viable
methods available to golf course architects who wish to protect
their hole designs from unauthorized copying. While golf course
designers may attempt several methods to achieve protection, none
are helpful or available to most golf course architects.
'Paul Hodge, Public Gets Chance to Comment on Golf Course Proposal, WASH. POST, Dec.
3, 1992, at VO.8 (reporting that the number of golfers in the United States has grown at an
annual rate of 3.9% since 1987 which is double the previous growth rate and a dramatic
increase over other sports like tennis and skiing).
2 Harry J. O7ane & William L. Schaller, Injuries from Errant Golf Balls: Liability
Theories and Defenses, 37 FEDWN OF INS. & CORP. CouNs. Q. 247 (1987).
3 JAMES M. LANE, THE COMPLETE GOLFERS ALMANAC 1996 331 (1996) (reporting that
there are 24,563,000 golfers and 14,000 golf courses in the United States).
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II. SHORTCOMINGS IN THE AVAILABLE PROTECTIONS
A. COPYRIGHTING THE PLANS AND DRAWINGS
Golf course architects and designers may attempt to protect their
hole designs by claiming copyright on the plans and drawings of the
holes. Such plans and drawings are copyrightable under the
Copyright Act of 1976,4 which defines copyrightable subject matter
to include "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works."5 These works
"include two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine,
graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions,
maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings,
including architectural plans.'
"Technical drawings" of golf course hole designs fit within the
items described as copyrightable under the 1976 Act.7 In fact, the
House Report that accompanied the 1976 Act clarified any ambigu-
ities regarding drawings' inclusion stating that "[an architect's
plans and drawings would, of course, be protected by copyright."'
Additionally, courts and commentators agree that architectural
plans and drawings are copyrightable. 9
At first glance, copyrighting drawings and design plans of golf
holes seems to be a viable method of protecting architects' golf hole
designs. However, obtaining copyright protection for drawings and
plans provides little or no realistic protection for the golf course
architect. Surprisingly, prior to 1990, unauthorized construction
4 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1994).
5 17 U.S.C. § 102(aX5) (1994).
6 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (emphasis added).
7 id.
8 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,5668; see also
Raphael Winick, Copyright Protection For Architecture After The Architectural Works
Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 41 DuKE L.J. 1598, 1608-609 (1992). Additionally, the
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 added architectural plans to the Copyright
Act as a protected class of subject matter. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-568 § 4(aX1XA), 102 Stat. 2853, 2854 (1988) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 101).
' See Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 658, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that
architectural plans, drawings, and models fit within the Copyright Act because they are
expressions of ideas and are not "useful articles"). See generally MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAvID NIMMER, NIMER ON CO'YRIGHT § 2.08[D][2][a]; David E. Shipley, Copyright
Protection for Architectural Works, 37 S.C. L. REV. 393 (1986).
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from copyrighted plans did not constitute infringement.' ° Numer-
ous cases have held that simply copyrighting plans protects only
against copying of the plans themselves and does not preclude
copying of the actual structure.' These cases reason that the
plans only represent the idea or expression of the structure and not
the structure itself. 2 Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act also
adopts this view." The copyright owner of the plans holds only
a copyright in the expression (the plans) of the idea (building itself)
and does not have any copyright in the idea alone. 4
Copying a building by viewing it, or by any means
other than actually copying, or using, the plans,
therefore only constituted copying an 'idea'. Repro-
ducing a building by observing, measuring, drawing,
or photographing an existing building, without using
copyrighted plans, would be classified as non-infring-
ing reverse engineering. Only by copying plans could
one copy the expression within which those ideas
were embodied."
10 Winick, supra note 8, at 1609. This result was changed by Congress' passage of The
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990 (AWCPA). However, the AWCPA
applies only to "buildings' and not other two and three-dimensional objects such as golf
courses. See discussion infra part I.B.
" See Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 657 F. Supp. 70, 75 (W.D. Va. 1987) (holding that
construction of a building from unauthorized plans does not constitute copyright infringe-
ment), rev'd, 842 F.2d 1292 (4th Cir. 1988); Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895,
899 (5th Cir. 1972) (stating that copyright in architectural plans does not "clothe their author
with the exclusive right to reproduce the dwelling pictured."); Herman Frankel Org. v.
Tegman, 367 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (stating that "[a] person cannot, by
copyrighting plans, prevent the building of a house similar to that taught by the copyrighted
plans. One does not gain a monopoly on the ideas expressed in the copyrighted material by
the act of registering them for copyright."); Winick, supra note 8, at 1609 n.53.
1 2 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (holding that copyright protects only expression
and not the underlying ideas).
" "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
a work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
" Winick, supra note 8, at 1609 n.53.
15 Winick, supra note 8, at 1609 n.53.
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Therefore, golf course designers would essentially gain no real
protection from claiming copyrighting on their hole design and
course layout plans.
Any golf course architect who wishes to copy the hole designs of
a competitor may do so by simply going to a competitor's course and
photographing or videotaping the hole design and course layout.
By constructing replicas of the competitor's holes from the photos
or videotapes, an infringement of the copyrighted plans could be
avoided completely because no use of the copyrighted material has
occurred. So, while golf course design plans are copyrightable and
course architects may feel protected by claiming copyright on their
hole design plans, the designers essentially gain no practical
protection.
B. CONGRESS'S PASSAGE OF THE ARCHITECTURAL WORKS COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION ACT OF 1990 LENDS NO HELP
In 1990 Congress took a major step in protecting architectural
structures by passing the Architectural Works Copyright Protection
Act (AWCPA).6 This Act purported to resolve the aforementioned
dilemma by extending copyright protection to the actual structure.
Section 703 of the AWCPA adds "architectural works" to the
"works of authorship" list in § 102 of the Copyright Act of 1976.17
An "architectural work" is defined as "the design of a building as
embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a
building, architectural plans, or drawings.1 8  However, the
AWCPA protects only the design of "buildings" and thus fails to
protect many architectural works that are not classified as
"buildings."
Interestingly, the original version of the AWCPA contained much
broader protection for architectural works.19 The original draft
16 Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 701-706, 104 Stat. 5133 (1990) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
17 Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 703, 104 Stat. 5133 (1990) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 102(aXS)).
' Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 702(a),
104 Stat. 5133, 5133 (1990) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 101).
1 H.R. 3990, 101st Cong. § 2(a) (1990), reprinted in Architectural Design Protection:
Hearings on H.R. 3990 and 3991 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and
the Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 101st Cong.,
340 [Vol. 5:337
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would have provided copyright protection to other "three-dimension-
al structures"2' including "cases where architectural works [were]
embodied in innovative structures that defy easy classification."21
This phrase was eventually deleted from the current Act because
Congress feared that it would extend protection too far. "Interstate
highway bridges, cloverleafs, canals, dams, and pedestrian
walkways" were all items that the House Subcommittee feared
would fit within the broader definition.' Subsequently, the final
version of the Act protects only a narrowly defined category of
architectural subject matter.
"Golf courses, gardens, tunnels, bridges, overpasses, fences, and
walls are only a few of the structures designed by architects that
would not fit the common definition of 'building.' "' In order for
golf courses or other architectural structures that are not "build-
ings" to qualify for copyright protection under the current version
of the AWCPA, courts would have to strain the ordinary definition
of "building."
Regardless of how far courts are willing to stretch that term, it
is not feasible for a golf course to ever constitute a "building" under
the current Act. Therefore, even though Congress enacted the
AWCPA, which provides protection for some architectural struc-
tures in addition to protection for the plans, Congress' restriction
of the new protection to "buildings" provides little hope for golf
course architects seeking protection of their designs.
Indeed, a golf course more appropriately constitutes an "organiza-
tion of space" rather than a building.24 Works like golf courses
that are not enclosed by any structure, although perhaps requiring
much time, effort, and expense to design, and having a large
potential for copying, simply cannot be considered buildings.
Unless Congress revises its definition of architectural works in
§ 101, "only a distorted application of 'building' will protect these
works."' So with no real protection available as an "architectural
2d Sess. 60-61 (1990).
20 Id.
" H.R. REP. No. 101-735 at 19-20 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6950-51.
n Id.
23 Winick, supra note S, at 1613.
2
4 Winick, supra note 8, at 1615.
25 Winick, supra note 8, at 1615.
1997]
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work" under the AWCPA, golf course architects must seek protec-
tion for their course designs elsewhere.
C. FEASIBILITY OF PROTECTION UNDER 17 u.s.c. § 102(A)(5) AS
"PICTORIAL, GRAPHIC [OR] SCULPTURAL WORKS-
Since golf course architects and designers cannot find any hope
of protection under 17 U.S.C. § 101 and the AWCPA, the only other
alternative for acquiring copyright protection of their course designs
is under 17 U.S.C. § 102(aX5) as a "pictorial, graphic [or] sculptur-
al" work. Under this section, the insurmountable hurdle for course
designers is having their golf holes satisfy the separability test for
utilitarian objects.
In order to achieve copyright protection under 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(aX5) as a "graphic" or "sculptural" work, an entire golf hole
must be categorized as a non-useful article.2 Regardless of how
aesthetically pleasing a golf hole may be, if the hole is a composi-
tion of purely utilitarian objects, the hole will not be afforded
copyright protection. This section of the Copyright Act of 1976
defines a "useful article" as "an article having an intrinsic utilitari-
an function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the
article or to convey information."27 The 1976 Act further defines
"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" to include:
works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form
but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are
concerned; the design of a useful article... shall be
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work
only if, and only to the extent that, such design
incorporates pictorial, graphic or sculptural features
that can be identified separately from, and are
capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian
aspects of the article.28
26 17 U.S.C. § 102(aX5) (1994).
27 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
2 id.
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Golf holes can be correctly classified as artistic creations of
landscape architecture. The courses' artistic nature is reflected in
their beauty and design. "A good golf course grows on one like a
good painting, good music, or any other artistic creation."' All
golfers would agree that courses such as Augusta National have
hole designs that can perhaps only be described as works of "art".
Classification as a form of "art", however, does little to advance a
golf hole's chances of achieving copyrightability under this section.
1. The Utility Test. Section 102 presents two major hurdles that
golf holes will have great difficulty overcoming. First, a golf hole
cannot avoid being labeled and classified as a "useful" article. 0
Golf holes are designed to be played by golfers. As such, their
primary function is to be "used" for the purpose for which they were
created and designed. While striking artistic beauty accompanies
many of the world's best golf holes, the holes were not designed
primarily for this purpose. Instead, course designers design golf
holes to challenge, and often frustrate, the golfer. Since golf holes
are designed primarily to be played, they are appropriately
classified as articles "having an intrinsic utilitarian function that
is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey
information." 1 Therefore, golf holes meet the definition of a
useful article and can only be copyrighted to the extent that they
satisfy the separability test.
2. The Separability Test. The second insurmountable hurdle for
most golf holes in their quest for copyright protection under § 102
is the holes' inability to satisfy the separability test. Simply stated,
the separability test allows only the nonfunctional elements of an
" By His Design: Besides Designing Courses, Architect Alister Mackenzie was a Man of
Letters - and Opinions, GOLF MAG., April 1, 1995, at 118 (quoting ALISTER MACKENZIE, THE
SPIRIT OF ST. ANDREWS (Sleeping Bear Press eds., 1995)).
's See L-A. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (deeming
athletic shoes useful articles because designed to be worn); Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado, Corp.,
697 F.2d 890, 893, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 698 (9th Cir. 1982) (classifying display folders as
useful articles because their primary purpose was to display and advertise carpet samples);
Norris Indus., Inc. v. Intl Tel. and Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 922, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 226
(11th Cir. 1983) (classifying wire spoked wheel cover as a useful article because of its use as
part of the wheel); Custom Chrome, Inc. v. Ringer, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1714 (D.D.C. 1995)
(holding that motorcycle parts were useful articles because the parts were used in operating
the motorcycle).3' 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
1997] 343
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article that is of a primarily utilitarian function to be eligible for
copyright protection. 2 In other words, if an article's overall
function is primarily useful, only the elements of the article that
are not functional can receive copyright protection.
Unfortunately for golf course architects, golf holes are composed
almost exclusively of functional components. Items that are
functional in nature are not eligible for copyright protection.3 An
item is functional if it is essential to the product's use.
All golf holes have certain common items that are functional. For
example, all holes have a green, fairway, tee-box, and most contain
at least one bunker or sand-trap. While shapes and sizes of these
features may vary, some form of these items is essential to the
creation and design of every golf hole. Since all holes require the
existence and use of some combination of these features, the
features are functional ones. If Congress allowed one golf course
architect copyright protection for these functional features, that
architect would have a monopoly on the golf course design market.
The separability test does allow nonfunctional features copyright
protection, but only to the extent that these features can be
separated from the utilitarian aspects of the article.' Courts are
unsettled as to what degree of separation is required.' The
Second Circuit has used as many as three different tests in making
this determination: (1) whether the article has a "primary
ornamental aspect" that can be conceptually separated from its
"subsidiary utilitarian function"; (2) whether the article's artistic
features are necessary or inextricably intermingled with utilitarian
features; and (3) whether the design elements show the designer's
artistic judgment independent of the functional considerations.36
Regardless of which test a court may follow, most golf holes'
features are not likely to meet the degree of separability required
' Winick, supra note 8, at 1602 n.24; see Shira Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and
Copyright in the Designs of Useful Articles, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'y U.SA. 339,339-41 (1990)
(stating that the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright only to the extent that it
can be identified separately from the article's utilitarian function).
' This exclusion stems from fear that one party will monopolize a particular market due
to exclusive rights to use an item that is essential in every product of a certain type.
Perlmutter, supra note 32, at 340.
Perlmutter, supra note 32, at 340-41.
' Perlmutter, supra note 32, at 341.
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to achieve copyright protection.
Some golf holes may have primarily ornamental features that can
be separated from the feature's utilitarian function. However, the
converse is true for most golf hole features. For example, a certain
picturesque lake, stream, or waterfall designed in a particularly
aesthetically pleasing manner may, at first glance, appear to be
primarily ornamental in nature. However, this same lake or
stream also acts as a water hazard thereby serving an inseparable
utilitarian function. Even the picturesque lighthouse at Harbour
Town's eighteenth hole serves the useful function of a landmark by
which most players line up their tee shots. Therefore, golf hole
features that appear to be merely ornamental can also serve useful
functions. The dual ornamental/useful nature of most features
existing on a golf course also shows that these features are
necessary and inextricably intertwined with the useful features.
Additionally, because most features serve both an artistic and
useful function, golf course features do not reflect the course
designer's artistic judgment independent of functional consider-
ations." Therefore, the inability of golf course features to rid
themselves of useful and functional qualities shows little promise
for their ability to acquire the degree of separability necessary to
receive any copyright protection.
Copyrighting a golf hole as a "pictorial, graphic [or] sculptural"
work under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) is not a feasible method of protection
for golf course architects. While many golf holes contain beautiful
artistic creations of landscape design, golf holes are useful articles
that exist primarily to be played by golfers. As useful articles, the
holes must undergo some test of separability before any feature of
a golf hole can gain copyright protection. Since most hole features
serve a dual purpose of ornamentation and usefulness, very few golf
course features will acquire copyright protection. Thus, claiming
37 See Esquire v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (disallowing
an entire article's design copyright protection no matter how aesthetically pleasing the
design); Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411,228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 385
(2d Cir. 1985) (holding that mannequins could not be copyrighted regardless of their
aesthetically pleasing attributes because they were useful articles and had no features that
could be separated from their usefulness); Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834
F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987) (denying bicycle rack that was originally created as a work of art
copyright protection because of its usefulness as a bike rack).
1997] 345
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copyright on a golf hole design under § 102 of the 1976 Copyright
Act is not a viable means of protection for golf course architects to
pursue.
D. FEASIBILITY OF A TRADE DRESS INFRINGEMENT ACTION UNDER
THE LANHAM ACT
Golf course architects may seek some hope of protection by suing
for Trade Dress Infringement under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act.' While this method of protection may prove successful in
some instances, it is difficult to establish and is practically
unavailable for most golf course architects. Therefore, suit for
trade dress infringement under the Lanham Act is not likely to be
a viable means of protecting a golf course architect's designs.
1. Establishing an Action for Trade Dress Infringement. A trade
dress infringement action involves a two-step analysis. First, a
court must determine whether the plaintiff's trade dress qualifies
for protection.39 This step requires examination of the following
factors: (1) functionality, (2) distinctiveness, and (3) secondary
meaning.' ° If the court finds that these factors are met, then the
court must decide whether an actual infringement has occurred. 41
An infringement occurs only when there is a likelihood of confusion
between the product or services of the plaintiff and the defen-
dant.42
a. Functionality. The functionality doctrine prevents one party
from monopolizing as its trademark or trade dress a product
feature or design that serves a primarily utilitarian purpose. 3
Since functional features are required in the design of every
product, functional trade dress is not protectable under the Lanham
Act.4
The Supreme Court has continually refined its definition of
functionality over the years. In Inwood Laboratories, Inc v. Ives
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
Blue Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1989).40 id.
41 Id.
42 id.
Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1513, 1555 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co v. Cox U.S.A., 732 F.2d 417, 425 (5th Cir. 1984).
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Laboratories, Inc.," the Court defined a functional feature or
design as one that "is essential to the use or purpose of the article
or [that] ... affects the cost or quality of the article.' This
definition was expanded thirteen years later in Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Products Co. 47 There the Court held that functionality
depends on (1) whether a product design or feature is essential to
the use or purpose of the article, and (2) whether the plaintiff's
exclusive use of the design would inhibit competition.' As
discussed above, golf courses as a whole are functional because they
are designed to be played by golfers. Further, most individual
features of golf courses would fit within the Supreme Court's
definition of functional because the course features serve as useful
and necessary features of a golf hole.49
b. Distinctiveness. In addition to meeting the functionality
requirement, trade dress must also be inherently distinctive. 50
Trade dress meets the inherently distinctive definition if its
"intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a prod-
uct."5' The Fifth Circuit refined this definition in Chevron Chemi-
cal Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc.,52 stating "[i]f the
features of the trade dress sought to be protected are arbitrary and
serve no function either to describe the product or assist in its
effective packaging," then the trade dress is inherently distinc-
tive.' "[T]rade dress may be (1) fanciful; (2) arbitrary; (3)
suggestive; (4) descriptive; or (5) generic."54
c. Secondary Meaning. Secondary meaning is acquired
distinctiveness. The trade dress of a product achieves secondary
meaning when the primary significance of the dress in the minds
4456 U.S. 844 (1982).
"Id. at 850-51 n.10.
'4 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
4Id. at 163.
See supra part II.C.
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768-69, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081
(1992).
51Id. at 768.
659 F.2d 695, 702, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 904 (5th Cir. 1981).
"Id.
Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1513, 1556 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
1997] 347
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of consumers is not the product, but the source of the product.55
The key inquiry in determining secondary meaning is whether the
consumers link the trade dress to a single source.' The following
factors are often used by courts to determine whether a design has
achieved secondary meaning: (1) the amount and nature of
advertising that emphasizes the design and its distinctive, identify-
ing features; (2) consumer survey evidence linking the design and
a single source; and (3) the defendant's intent in copying the
design.
57
2. Golf Courses Designs Have Trouble Meeting the Trade Dress
Requirements. The only case that deals with an attempt to extend
trade dress protection to golf course design is Pebble Beach Co. v.
Tour 18 1, Ltd.' This case involved consolidated actions by three
golf courses stating several claims under the Lanham Act
59
including service mark infringement, unfair competition, false
advertising, and trade dress infringement.' The complaining golf
courses also alleged claims under Texas law for common law unfair
competition, conversion, civil conspiracy, and service mark and
trade dress dilution under the Texas anti-dilution statute.6 1 This
Note will focus only on the trade dress infringement and dilution
sections of this case. All claims of unfair competition and service
mark infringement deal primarily with infringing marks and not
the hole designs themselves.
a. Background Facts. The plaintiffs in this case consist of
three separate parties: Pebble Beach, Resorts of Pinehurst, Inc.,
and Sea Pines, Inc. Pebble Beach, a California partnership, owns
and operates a golf and vacation resort in California that includes
five golf courses: (1) Pebble Beach Golf Links; (2) The Links at
Spanish Bay; (3) Spyglass Hill; (4) Peter Hay Golf Course; and (5)
"Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161
(1995).
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Ins., 505 U.S. 763, 768-69 (1992).
'7 Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1452, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1724 (3d Cir. 1994); Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 795-
96, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 988 (5th Cir. 1983).
" 942 F. Supp. 1513 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994).
o Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1526.
*l Id.; TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (West Supp. 1997).
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Old Del Monte Golf Course.62 Resorts of Pinehurst, Inc., a North
Carolina corporation, operates a golf resort that includes seven golf
courses.' Sea Pines, a South Carolina corporation, owns and
operates a golf and tennis resort called Harbour Town Golf Links
on Hilton Head Island."
The defendant, Tour 18 I, Ltd., is a limited partnership located
in Humble, Texas that owns and operates two golf courses, one
located in Humble and another in Flower Mound, Texas.' Both
of Tour 18's courses consist of golf holes that have been copied from
famous golf courses throughout the country, including the plain-
tiffs'." At its Humble, Texas course, Tour 18 copied three holes
from the plaintiffs' golf courses: Pebble Beach Hole 14, Pinehurst
Course No. 2 Hole 3, and Harbour Town Hole 18. Also, Tour 18
replicated Harbour Town's Hole 18 at its Flower Mound, Texas
course.
67
Tour 18 carefully researched and planned the building of its
copied golf course. For two years the owners of Tour 18 traveled to
several golf courses to videotape the golf holes they had selected to
duplicate. The owners went to Pebble Beach in February 1991 and
videotaped the 14th hole without Pebble Beach's permission.'
Additionally, Tour 18 traveled to Harbour Town and Pinehurst to
videotape the 18th and 3rd holes, respectively. All of this videotap-
ing occurred without the permission or knowledge of the owners of
the courses that were copied."9 Apparently, Tour 18 took aerial
2 Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1526-27.
Id. at 1527.
6 Id.
6 Id.
S The following is a list of the golf holes that Tour 18 copied for its Humble, Texas
course: Hole # (1) Harbour Town #18 (Hilton Head Island, S.C.); (2) Bay Hill #6 (Orlando,
Fla.); (3)Pinehurst No. 2, Hole 3 (Pinehurst, N.C.); (4) Inverness #18 (Toledo, Ohio); (5)
Augusta National #11 (Augusta, Ga.); (6) Augusta National #12 (Augusta, Ga.); (7) Augusta
National #13 (Augusta, Ga.); (8) LaCosta #4 (Carlsbad, Ca.); (9) Sawgrass #17 (Ponte Vedra,
Fla.); (10) Desert Inn #10 (Las Vegas, Nev.); (11) Disney #6 (Orlando, Fla.); (12) Colonial #3
(Ft. Worth, Tex.); (13) Pebble Beach #14 (Pebble Beach, Ca.); (14) Oakmont #3 (Oakmont,
Penn.); (15) Shinnecock Hills #8 (Long Island, N.Y.); (16) Merion #11 (Philadelphia, Pa.); (17)
Oak Tree #8 (Edmund, Okla.); (18) Doral #18 (Miami, Fla.). Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at
1532.67 Id.
lId. at 1532.
Id. at 1532-33.
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photographs and videos of each hole that they intended to copy.70
Tour 18 then hired an engineering firm to create three-dimen-
sional golf hole designs from their bootlegged videotapes and
photos. Tour 18 also purchased maps of Pebble Beach's Hole 14. 7'
Tour 18 used these blueprints generated from the tapes and maps
to replicate the plaintiffs' golf holes. The holes chosen for replica-
tion were chosen to coordinate with the landscape in Houston.7 2
Some of the holes were built around existing trees that looked
similar to the ones located on the famous holes that were copied.
However, most of the vegetation was imported. For example, to
construct the "Amen Corner" of Augusta National, Tour 18 brought
in and planted 2,000 azaleas, 400 crape myrtles, 400 dogwoods and
truckloads of Georgia pine needles.7" Tour 18 even built a replica
of the lighthouse present on Harbour Town's Hole No. 18. 7'
Golfers who have played both the Tour 18 copied course and the
originals say that most of its features are better than ninety-five
percent accurate.75 Tour 18 has even gone so far as to copy the
original holes' mowing patterns for the greens and fairways.7"
Tour 18 aggressively marketed their courses and even advertised
that their courses were compilations of "America's Greatest 18
Holes."77 In its advertisements, Tour 18 refers to its holes as
"exact replicas, careful simulations," and "painstaking re-creations"
of the country's best golf holes.78 In addition, Tour 18 used
plaintiffs' service marks, Pebble Beach, Harbour Town and
Pinehurst and pictures of the lighthouse extensively in its advertis-
ing.79 Plaintiffs' service marks are also used on Tour 18's course
signs and course materials including scorecards, yardage books, and
70 Counterfeit Golf, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 20, 1993, at 94.
71 Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1533. The maps used by Tour 18 concerning the Pebble
Beach hole had been copyrighted. However, as noted above, this does not provide any real
protection. See discussion supra part II.A.
7'Counterfeit Golf, THE EcONOMIST, Feb. 20, 1993, at 94.73id.
74 Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1533.
7" Counterfeit Golf, THE EcoNOMIST, Feb. 20, 1993, at 94.
76id.
7' Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1533.
78 Id,
7 Id,
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other written materials.80
Tour 18 sought to preclude any possible infringements by placing
disclaimers in much of its written material and on the sign in front
of each Tour 18 golf hole. One of Tour 18's main arguments is that
the disclaimers sufficiently preclude any confusion generated by
copying plaintiffs' golf holes and using their service marks."1
While Tour 18 has placed many disclaimers on its scorecards,
yardage books, and hole signs, many advertisements in newspa-
pers, magazines, and other trade publications contained no such
disclaimers.8 2
Tour 18 has enjoyed tremendous success since opening its copy-
courses in Texas. In its first year of operations, Tour 18 cleared
profits of over 1.7 million dollars on an initial investment of 5
million dollars.' Tour 18's courses consistently sell more rounds
per year than other public courses in the Houston and Dallas
areas.8" Because of its overwhelming success, Tour 18 has plans
to expand and build copy-courses at other possible cites in Arizona,
Georgia, and Virginia.' Tour 18's success is directly attributable
to its concept of copying the golf holes of other famous golf cours-
es.
86
b. Trade Dress Infringement. The plaintiffs argued that Tour
18's copying of their golf holes and the Harbour Town lighthouse
constituted trade dress infringement and unfair competition in
violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 7 The Texas district
so Id. at 1534.
M'Id. at 1534-35. Tour 18's scorecard contains the following disclaimer: 'he design of
this course was inspired by great holes from 16 different golf courses. None of the courses
endorse, sponsor, or are affiliated with Tour 18." This same disclaimer is located in the
yardage guide and Tour 18's promotional brochures. The signs at each tee on Tour 18's
courses also contains a disclaimer. It reads as follows: "The design of this hole was inspired
by the famous [each famous hole name]. Tour 18 is not affiliated with, endorsed, or
sponsored by [original creator of golf hole]." Additionally, the first tee box on Tour 18's
course contains an overall disclaimer that states that "[tihe design of this course was
inspired by the great holes from the 16 different golf courses. None of these course endorse,
sponsor, or are affiliated with Tour 18." Id.
Id. at 1535.
83 Id.
8 Id.
85 Id.
" Id. at 1536.87 Id. at 1554; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
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court noted that trade dress "embodies 'that arrangement of
identifying characteristics or decorations connected to a product,
whether by packaging or otherwise, intended to make the source of
the product distinguishable from another and to promote its
sale.' " The court went on to note that the actual design or
appearance of the product itself, rather than just the packaging, is
protectable under the Lanham Act." "The trade dresses at issue
in this case include the shapes of plaintiffs' golf holes, the length
and width of the holes [and fairways], the placement and shape of
sand and water hazards, the size and shape of the greens, the slope
and elevation of the holes, and the golf hole's surrounding vegeta-
tion.'
As noted above, a trade dress infringement claim involves a two-
step process. The court must first decide whether plaintiffs' trade
dresses qualify for protection. This depends on the following three
issues: (1) functionality; (2) secondary meaning, and (3) distinctive-
ness.
91
i. Functionality. On the surface, this prong appears to be
insurmountable for golf hole designers because all features found
on a golf course are functional. Surprisingly, however, the Texas
District Court found that golf hole designs are not functional. Tour
18 argued that the designs of the plaintiffs' golf holes are just
arrangements of purely functional features and are therefore not
worthy of trade dress protection.92  The court noted that by
focusing on the functional nature of the individual features, Tour
18 focused on the wrong inquiry.93 Plaintiffs claimed as their
identifying mark, not all holes with bunkers, but their particular
arrangements of these functional features that constitute their hole
designs.9 "Whether the configuration of [an article] is functional
or can receive trademark protection depends on whether its design
Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1554 (quoting Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1239,
20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (6th Cir. 1991)).
a Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1555 (citing Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters.,
Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1438 (3d Cir. 1994)).
9o Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1555.
1 d.; Blue Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1989).
"Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1555-56 (quoting Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Intern.,
Inc. 814 F.2d 346, 350, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2067 (7th Cir. 1987)).
Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1555.
"'Id
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as a whole is superior to other designs, not on whether its compo-
nent features viewed individually each have a function."' Addi-
tionally, "a particular arbitrary combination of functional features,
the combination of which is not itself functional, properly enjoys
protection.""
Focusing on golf holes in their entirety was the key to the finding
of nonfunctionality for the Texas district court. An unlimited
number of designs could have been used rather than plaintiffs'
particular configurations. Additionally, the court noted that no
evidence indicated that plaintiffs' particular designs were superior
to any other designs and configurations.'
The Texas district court buttressed its finding of nonfunctionality
by pointing to evidence showing that it was unnecessary for Tour
18 to copy these holes to compete in the golf course market.9"
These plaintiffs had not monopolized the golf course design market
by utilizing these particular designs. Nothing precluded Tour 18
from constructing more challenging and possibly more aesthetically
pleasing hole designs than those belonging to the plaintiffs.
According to the court, this evidence supported the underlying
rationale of the functionality requirement to protect against one
designer monopolizing a particular market.
The functionality requirement did not give the Texas district
court as much trouble as one might expect. The court simply chose
to take a broad focus of a golf hole's design, rather than focusing on
a hole's individual features. By focusing on the entire hole's
configuration rather than its individual components, the Texas
district court found that the functionality requirement can be
successfully met. There is no question that bunkers, fairways,
greens, tee boxes, and water hazards are all functional items that,
alone, cannot be considered protectable trade dress. The Texas
court, however, chose to shift focus away from the functional items
to the items' arrangements. Only if other courts are willing to
focus broadly like this one, will golf course architects encounter as
m Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1555-56 (quoting Vaughan Mfg. Co., 814 F.2d at 350)
(emphasis in original).
" Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. 1555-56 (quoting Taco Cabana Int'l v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932
F.2d 1113, 1119 (5th Cir. 1991)).
' Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp at 1556.
9id.
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little trouble meeting the nonfunctionality requirement of trade
dress protection as these plaintiffs.
ii. Distinctiveness. If successful in showing that a golf hole
design is nonfunctional, the course architect must still meet
additional requirements." Perhaps the most troublesome require-
ment for golf course designers is the distinctiveness requirement.
Almost all golf holes are compilations of the same features. All
have a tee box, a fairway, and a green. Most holes include at least
one bunker or other type of hazard. Thus, the distinctiveness
prong of the trade dress test will be unachievable for most golf
course architects.
In fact, the Texas district court agreed by finding that Pebble
Beach's Hole No. 14 and Pinehurst's No. 2 Hole 3 were not
inherently distinctive."° To rise to the level of inherent distinc-
tiveness, the golf hole would have to be so unique as to be identi-
fied with only one particular source.10' The plaintiffs in Pebble
Beach tried to assert that their holes were inherently distinctive
because no other golf holes in the world were identical to their golf
holes. The Texas district court quickly rejected this argument.
Pointing to much authority,10 2 the court concluded that just
because "no other golf holes resemble or are designed exactly like
plaintiffs' does not make the holes inherently distinctive."0 3
The court held that Pebble Beach Hole 14 and Pinehurst No. 2
Hole 3 were not so distinctive as to automatically identify their
source. These holes simply do not have any distinctive features.
The holes are just "variations on common designs already prevalent
in the golf course industry"'O and are not suggestive of their
source. The hole designs do not" 'suggest' anything to consumers
other than that they are golf holes.""0 5 The Texas district court
' The course architect must still show that the hole design is sufficiently distinct, and
that the design has achieved secondary meaning.100 Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1557.
'o11d. at 1556 (citing Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. at 768-69).
' Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1447 (3d Cir. 1994); see
Turtle Wax, Inc. v. First Brands Corp., 781 F. Supp. 1314, 1321 (N.D. Ill. 1991); 1 MCCARTHY
§ 8.02[4] (stating that simply because no similar articles exist, inherently distinct status is
not automatically conferred).
'03 Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1557.1
, Id. at 1558.
105 Id.
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concluded that these two holes were therefore merely descriptive
and protectable only upon a showing of secondary meaning." e
Harbour Town Hole 18 was, however, successful in showing
inherent distinctiveness. 7 This hole, "because of its association
with and incorporation of the lighthouse, contains arbitrary source-
identifying features that make its design inherently distinc-
tive."~ The hole, however, stands as an exception to the proposi-
tion that golf holes are not likely to achieve inherent distinctive-
ness.
The presence of the lighthouse in the background of Harbour
Town's Hole 18 was the main reason this hole achieved this
difficult distinct status. However, the Texas district court probably
placed an excessive amount of weight on the presence of the man-
made lighthouse. Distinctiveness should be measured through the
impression made on the observer. "Man madeness" should not
matter here.
If an identifying mark needs to be man-made to achieve inherent-
ly distinct status, the court's protection will not reach very far.
Very few courses are built with man-made structures, such as
lighthouses, as their centerpieces and identifying marks. Golf holes
are generally compilations of natural objects such as trees, grass,
sand, and water. For example, it is uncertain after the Texas
district court's decision whether a golf hole as famous as Pebble
Beach's Hole 18, which hails as its centerpiece the Pacific Ocean,
could achieve inherently distinct status. Although there is only one
hole in the world like Pebble Beach's Hole 18, it does not have a
man-made object as a distinguishing mark.1" If achieving inher-
ent distinctiveness requires the presence of a distinguishing man-
made object, as the Pebble Beach decision suggests, then very few
holes will be able to meet this prong of the test. If future courts
choose to follow the Texas district court's analysis here and do not
focus on the impression made on the observer, most golf course
architects will find that an "inherently distinctive" status is not
achievable.
106 Id.
1"7 Because Harbour Town's Hole 18 achieved inherently distinct status, it was not
necessary to establish that this hole had achieved secondary meaning.
'"8 Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1556.
'0 It is not likely, however, that Pebble Beach's Hole 18 could ever be truly replicated
because of its location on the Pacific Ocean.
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Additionally, most golf holes are not designed with a single
distinct feature sufficiently identifying their source. For example,
there may only be one golf hole in the world that has a huge cherry
tree splitting the fairway. Yet, this tree, being a common feature
found on many golf courses, will not be enough to qualify this hole
as inherently distinct. The same holds true for a uniquely shaped
green or bunker. Since greens and bunkers are found on all golf
courses, this will preclude a hole from being inherently distinctive.
Perhaps courts should broaden their focus and take the same
broad view that the Texas district court took with the element of
functionality. By focusing on the entire golf hole, and not just its
features, it is possible that a hole might be so uniquely designed as
to be classified as inherently distinctive. So far, however, no court
has chosen to broaden its focus in this manner. Therefore, while
it is technically possible for a golf hole to achieve distinct status,
the average golf hole does not have a very strong chance.
iii. Secondary Meaning. If a product is not classified as
being inherently distinct, the product can only be protectable trade
dress if it has achieved secondary meaning. The trade dress of a
product achieves secondary meaning when "the primary signifi-
cance of the dress in the minds of consumers is not the product, but
the source of the product.1 1 The key inquiry is whether consum-
ers connect the trade dress to a single source. 1 ' Courts examine
the following factors in determining whether a product has
achieved secondary meaning: (1) amount and nature of advertising
emphasizing the design and its distinctive identifying features; (2)
consumer survey evidence linking the design and a single source;
and (3) defendant's intent in copying the design. 112
(a). Advertising. The amount of advertising associating
plaintiffs' trade dress to a single source is a relevant inquiry. Both
Pebble Beach and Pinehurst produced evidence that they had
extensively advertised their golf courses. However, very few of the
11 Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1559 (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514
U.S. 159, 163 (1995)).
.. Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1559 (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763, 768-69 (1992)).
12 Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1559 (citing Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters.,
Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1452 (3d Cir. 1994); Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698
F.2d 786, 795-96 (5th Cir. 1983)).
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advertisements actually depicted the holes that were copied by
Tour 18. Pebble Beach could not present even one advertisement
of its course that depicted Hole 14. The court did suggest, however,
that if extensive exposure of the holes in question had occurred as
a result of television coverage, this might be enough to meet this
factor of the secondary meaning test.113  Neither Pebble Beach
nor Pinehurst could present any such evidence. Therefore, the
district court determined that the Pebble Beach and Pinehurst
holes had not been advertised in a manner that showed an
association between the advertised trade dress and the source of
the trade dress.
114
Most golf hole architects will not be able to show sufficient
advertising to achieve secondary meaning. Many golf courses do
not advertise as extensively as Pebble Beach and Pinehurst, both
of which were unable to show sufficient advertising. According to
this court's opinion, a golf course designer that wished his golf
holes to achieve secondary meaning in order to receive trade dress
protection would have to extensively advertise every hole on the
course. Every hole would essentially have to be a signature hole.
This view is impractical and virtually not achievable for most golf
course designers and architects. Additionally, if a course designer
must rely on television coverage to establish sufficient advertising,
very few designers will be successful in seeing that their holes
acquire secondary meaning because only a select few designers are
fortunate enough to have televised golf tournaments hosted on their
courses.
(b). Survey Evidence. "Survey evidence is the most direct
and persuasive way of establishing secondary meaning."15 This
type of evidence consists of consumer surveys that demonstrate
that consumers actually link the product to a single source.
The district court for the Southern District of Texas cursorily
stated that no plaintiffs in this case had presented any survey
evidence to show that their holes have achieved secondary mean-
ing.1"' The court did not elaborate further.1
7
"a Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1559-60.
114 Id.
"a Id, at 1560 (citing Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 795).
16 Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1560.
117 1&
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This prong also seems virtually not achievable for most golf
course designers. With the exception of a few golf holes on courses
in the world, it is unlikely that course designers could present
sufficiently concrete survey evidence to establish that the public
automatically associates a particular golf hole with a particular
course and course designer. Moreover, the accumulation and
presentation of such evidence would be very expensive, thereby
foreclosing this evidence as an option for many course designers.
(c). Intent To Copy. Evidence of intentional copying does
not automatically trigger a presumption of secondary meaning.
118
Pebble Beach's Hole 14 and Pinehurst's Hole 3 were unsuccessful
in their assertion that because Tour 18 intentionally copied their
holes, the copied holes had achieved secondary meaning. The
evidence presented in this case showed that these two holes had
been copied because of their location on famous golf courses, not
because the holes themselves were famous. These holes were
copied because they belonged to famous courses and service
marks." 9
If a golf hole must first become "famous" enough for a competitor
to intentionally copy it, many golf holes will be excluded from
achieving secondary meaning. For example, a competitor may
desire to copy a Jack Nicklaus hole design not because the hole
itself is famous, but because it is a Jack Nicklaus design. Thus, a
course designer such as Nicklaus could not adequately protect all
of his hole designs from being copied. Protection would only
potentially be available for those holes that had become famous.
While golf is gaining popularity, there are relatively few holes in
the world that would qualify as truly "famous."120 Yet, many
golfers would play courses simply because they knew the holes had
been designed by a famous golf course designer. Therefore,
requiring a hole first to be famous enough to be intentionally copied
does not provide adequate protection for course designers to protect
all of their hole designs.
"a Id.; Bristol Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil - P.P.C. Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1041-42 (2d Cir.
1992); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1182 n.13 (7th Cir. 1989).1 1 Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1560.
'2 For example, the hole commonly referred to as the Postage Stamp on St. Andrews is
one golf hole that has achieved world-wide fame.
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Because of the difficulty of compliance with any of these factors,
most golf holes will not be able to achieve secondary meaning
status. The District Court in Pebble Beach agreed by stating that
"proving secondary meaning for plaintiffs' golf holes is particularly
difficult since an individual golf hole is only one of the eighteen
holes that make up an entire course.""'2 The court went on to
note that each plaintiff in this case has eighteen separate trade
dresses.'2 "Thus, it is difficult to demonstrate that consumers
recognize and associate one particular golf hole from an entire
course with the source of the hole." 123
3. Likelihood of Confusion. As the only golf hole having been
successful in establishing trade dress status, Harbour Town's Hole
18 is the only hole that reached the question of likelihood of
confusion. The factors relevant to this determination are as
follows: "(1) the type and strength of plaintiff's trade dress; (2) the
degree of similarity between plaintiff's and defendant's trade dress;
(3) the similarity between plaintiff's and defendant's goods or
services; (4) the identity of plaintiff's and defendant's customers; (5)
the similarity of plaintiff's and defendant's advertising; (6) the
defendant's intent; (7) the existence of actual confusion."124
The district court for the Southern District of Texas found that
likelihood of confusion did exist as to Harbour Town's Hole 18."
The court noted that the existence of the lighthouse was a "strong,
distinctive identifier of source for Harbour Town Golf Links." 26
Evidence that suggested that Tour 18 intentionally copied this hole
and the lighthouse also pointed to a finding of confusion. 1 27
21 Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1560.
SId.
12 Id. It is worth noting that Harbour Town's Hole 18 did achieve secondary meaning.
However, this determination by the court was not necessary since the court had already
found that the hole was inherently distinctive. The court concluded that Harbour Town's
Hole 18 had been extensively exposed in advertising, including television advertising during
golf tournaments. Id. at 1559-60. Additionally, Harbour Town produced evidence to show
that Tour 18 had intentionally copied this hole because the hole itself was a famous one. Id.
at 1560.
'2 Id. at 1561 (citing Taco Cabana Intl v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1122 (5th Cir.
1991)).
" Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1561.
' Id.
d.
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The key inquiry here is whether Tour 18's copying of plaintiffs'
trade dress resulted in actual confusion as to source. The court
found that actual confusion existed. Sea Pines pointed to evidence
showing that golfers, after playing a round on a Tour 18 course,
were actually confused into believing that Tour 18 had received
permission from Harbour Town to replicate its golf hole design."2
Tour 18 fought this actual confusion evidence by arguing that it is
virtually impossible that a golfer playing a round of golf in Texas
would be actually confused into thinking he was playing the actual
hole at Pebble Beach or otherwise. 129 The court criticized this
argument for being too narrow."3 Likelihood of confusion exists
when a consumer is likely to be confused as to the source.'31 The
confusion problem arises when Tour 18's patrons are "confused"
into believing that the golf holes were duplicated with the plaintiffs'
permission.
132
Since Harbour Town's Hole 18 was the only hole successful in
establishing trade dress, it was the only hole that received any
protection from this court. Therefore, the court found in favor of
Sea Pines on its trade dress infringement claim pursuant to section
43(a) of the Lanham Act.1" Pebble Beach's Hole 14 and Pine-
hurst's Hole 3, however, unfortunately received no protection.
Pursuant to the findings of this court, these holes are apparently
free to be copied at will.
E. FEASIBILITY OF A SUIT FOR VIOLATION OF AN ANTI-DILUTION
STATUTE
Golf course designers and architects can try to sue for dilution of
their golf holes' trade dresses under federal or state anti-dilution
statutes. The purpose of an anti-dilution statute is to preclude the
"whittling away" of a party's distinctive trademark or trade
1mid.
1 Id. at 1541.
O Id.
ul Id.
H2 id.
M d.
360 (Vol. 5:337
24
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol5/iss1/8
GOLF COURSE DESIGNERS
name. 1" Anti-dilution statutes have been held to apply "with
equal force" to protection of trade dress."i 5 To establish a dilution
claim, a plaintiff must show (1) ownership of distinctive dress, and
(2) likelihood of dilution.1" A likelihood of dilution can be shown
under either of two separate theories: dilution by "tarnishment",
and dilution by "blurring."3 7  Dilution by "tarnishment" occurs
when a trade dress is "linked to products of shoddy quality, or is
portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context" such that "the
public will associate the lack of quality or lack of prestige in the
defendant's goods with the plaintiff's unrelated goods." 38
Dilution by blurring occurs when "[clustomers or prospective
customers ... see the plaintiff's mark used on a plethora of
different goods and services." 9 Dilution by blurring "refers to a
loss of distinctiveness, a weakening of a mark's propensity to bring
to mind a particular product, service, or source of either."'
40
For a golf course architect to seek protection of hole designs
under an anti-dilution statute, the designer must first show that
his trade dresses are distinctive. Golf hole designers run into the
same problems here in establishing distinctiveness as are encoun-
tered in establishing a trade dress infringement claim under the
Lanham Act. As noted above, achieving distinctiveness for most
golf holes is virtually impossible since most golf holes are compila-
tions of non-distinct features. 141 Being unable to achieve distinct
status, most golf holes will not be successful in seeking protection
under anti-dilution statutes.
1 Fruit of the Loom, Inc. v. Girouard, 994 F.2d 1359, 1363, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1782,
1785 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24.13[1][a][I] (3d ed. 1996)).
" Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65, 73, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1010, 1016 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1252 (1995).
' Hormel Foods v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 506, 37 U.Q.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1516, 1522 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625, 217
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 658 (2d Cir. 1983)).
137 Hormel Foods, 73 F.3d at 506.
"
3 Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1936 (2d Cir.
1994).
' Hormel Foods, 73 F.3d at 506 (quoting 3 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24.13[1][a][I] (3d ed. 1996).
14 Jordache Enters. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 841 F. Supp. 506, 522, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1721 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (quoting Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Comm., 489
F. Supp. 1112, 1123, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
141 Harbour Town's Hole 18 is the only hole that has ever attempted to achieve distinct
status and been successful. Pebble Beach, 942. F. Supp. at 1567.
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III. CONCLUSION
Golf is currently one of the most popular sports and pastimes of
millions of Americans. The sport has grown rapidly in popularity
over the past several years. Due to this increased interest in the
game, more and more golf courses have sprung up around the
country. Gifted golf course architects spend many painstaking
hours to design and create their masterpieces. These course
designs and creations are a result of much time, effort, and
expense. Designing and constructing a golf course can easily cost
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars. Additionally, a
course designed by a famous architect can draw quite a crowd of
interested golfers, and be a very lucrative business, potentially
generating millions of dollars in revenue. Yet, course architects
really have no viable means of protecting their works from being
copied by others.
Claiming copyright on the golf hole design plans under § 101 of
the 1976 Copyright Act is a popular choice for most golf course
architects. However, this practice provides the designers with little
or no real protection. Nothing prevents a competitor from copying
and constructing the holes without using the copyrighted plans.
Additionally, copyrighting the plans does not give the course
architect any exclusive right to construct the ideas expressed in his
plans. While this method of alleged protection may provide some
piece of mind to the golf architects of the world, in reality, this
practice provides no real protection from course pirates.
Congress' passing of the AWCPA in 1990 did not lend any help
to the golf course architect's dilemma. The limited wording of the
AWCPA to include actual structures within the realm of copyright-
able material restricts the Act's application to any structure not
falling within the definition of a "building." Congress had its
chance to expressly include golf courses within the purviews of this
Act. However, Congress decided that extending protection to
structures that were not enclosed and did not classify as "build-
ings", would extend copyright protection too far. So, out of
Congress' fear of extending copyright protection too far, came
another blow for golf course architects who wished to find some real
protection for their course creations.
Claiming copyrighting on the golf hole itself under § 102 of the
Copyright Act of 1976 is not a viable method of protection either.
[Vol. 5:337362
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Golf courses undoubtably classify as "useful articles" and must
therefore undergo application of the separability test. The
application of this test sounds the death knell for most golf holes.
Since almost all golf holes are comprised of functional items that
cannot be separated from the overall utilitarian aspects of a golf
hole, very few, if any, features of a golf hole will be afforded
copyright protection. There may be, however, some holes that could
achieve protection for a certain feature that served no useful
purpose. Notwithstanding, the converse is true for most golf holes
because even seemingly ornamental features actually serve
functional purposes. Therefore, copyrighting a golf hole or its
features under this section is not feasible.
Since golf hole designs are valuable pieces of intellectual property
by which many entrepreneurs generate great profits, these designs
arguably should receive some copyright protection. Perhaps it is
time for Congress to amend the AWCPA to specifically include golf
courses so that a course would not be excluded by the narrow
definition of "buildings." Perhaps courts should take it upon
themselves to liberally interpret the AWCPA's definition of a
"building" to include golf courses. However accomplished, golf
courses should be entitled to receive some real protection.
Suing a competitor who has copied a golf hole design for trade
dress infringement under § 43 of the Lanham Act gives golf course
architects little assurance either. While technically, this type of
action could be successful,142 most golf holes do not possess the
distinctiveness or level of fame necessary to establish the golf hole
as protectable trade dress.
While the Texas district court circumvented the functionality
barrier by focusing on a golf hole's design in its entirety, the
distinctiveness and secondary meaning requirements wreak havoc
on golf holes attempting to establish an action for trade dress
infringement. Since almost all golf holes are compilations of
common features, it will be very difficult for a hole to establish a
level of distinctiveness that will serve as an indicator of source.
Also, the extremely high level of advertising, frequent lack of
'" Remember that Harbour Town's Hole 18 was successful in establishing an action for
trade dress infringement. This was due in large part to the existence of the lighthouse. This
successful case should, however, be regarded as an exception.
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helpful survey evidence, and the high level of fame required before
a golf hole can have secondary meaning will exclude most golf holes
from protection. If every golf hole has to be extensively advertised
and be very famous before receiving protection, most golf holes will
be excluded. Perhaps courts should lower these standards to
include more golf holes within the realm of protectable trade dress.
Finally, golf course architects find no relief by appealing to anti-
dilution statutes. The insurmountable hurdle of distinctiveness
acts as a bar to most golf holes here as well. Most holes simply are
not designed to be so distinct that they automatically identify their
source. Therefore, golf course architects will find little help from
the anti-dilution statutes.
Because of golf's increase in popularity, the sport has become big
business in this country. Some golf course designers are truly
blessed with an artistic and creative talent to create beautiful
courses. No reason exists why these golf hole designs should be
open to copying at will by competitors without duly compensating
the architects. Currently, however, little or no protective mecha-
nisms are in place to prevent this pirating of golf hole designs from
occurring.
ROBERT D. HowELL
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